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While many observers  thought it was  premature  for Czech  Prime Minister Klaus to 
suggest  in 1995 the transition was over  except for  fine-tuning ,
2 as we approach the 20
th  
year after the fall of the Berlin Wall on Nov. 9, 1989,-and the 18
th  after  the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union at Byelovezha- it is surely relevant to ask the question again.  The 
first new contribution of this paper is to show that ,for all practical purposes, the post-
communist  transition is over in eight or nine  early reformers of Central Europe and the 
Baltics; but it is not over  for other transition countries –though many  are close, and only 
a few very far behind.  
 
The second and perhaps  more important novelty of this paper is that it  goes beyond the  
qualitative  expert judgments in earlier studies addressing this question. With one or two 
exceptions, earlier studies did not start with  an explicit analytical definition of transition 
and its end-point, and evidence provided was selective  often mixing  partial quantitative 
measures  with qualitative judgments-albeit well reasoned ones.
3  This paper proposes an 
analytical  definition of transition and its end-point , as well as ways this can be measured 
quantitatively without undertaking impossibly massive econometric exercises . 
 
                                                 
1 I wish to thank for their  comments Al Berry,  Lou Pauly , and participants of the Munk Centre Seminar 
Oct. 1, 2008; the Czech Economic Association for the opportunity to present this paper at their Biannual 
Meeting Nov.30, 2008; Al Green , Frank Lewis and  other participants of the Queens University Economics 
Department History Workshop. 
2 The reference is to Svejnar (1999), p. 78 who questioned “ declarations such as that  of the Czech  Prime 
Minister in 1995.” 
3 Though I accept that many experts have the ability to make such a judgment and this can be valuable.   3
The countries covered in this assessment are the post-communist ones in Europe and  
Eurasia, excluding China and Vietnam which, partly because of the continuing dominant 
role of the Communist Party and partly because of the high initial level of agricultural 
activity, I consider analytically more similar to developing countries undertaking major 
market-oriented reforms than to the European post-communist group here. For data 
purposes the group is most fully covered by the  Annual Transition Report of the 
European Bank For Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) , though analysis here 
excludes Mongolia and some of the  countries in South-East Europe due to reporting 
being too recent. The period covered is approximately 1990-2007, though the latest years 
are not always available for every measure ; fortunately they are not always needed to 
make the main points. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the theoretical 
framework used to define transition and its end-point, while Section III derives from this 
a number of feasible measures as “stylized facts” for the end of transition. In Section IV 
the best available quantitative measures are shown-for the sake of brevity this is by 
country group rather than all 28  EBRD  countries. The main “stylized facts” used  are : 
Personal Consumption  share of GDP; Industry share of GDP ; openness of economy and 
geographic diversification of trade; and more tentatively some comparative advantage 
indicators.   Finally Section V. concludes with some answers to the main question “ is 
transition over”, noting the differences across countries and country-groupings. 
 
II.  DEFINING THE END OF TRANSITION   4
DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE GIVES DIFFERENT DEFINITION 
The meaning of transition and its aims may differ from the perspective of different 
individuals or groups in society. For most  citizens of the former communist countries, 
transition was seen as a way to overcome the backward economic conditions of the 
socialist world, and they might  define it  as catching up to income levels of the EU; let 
me call this definition POP1. For many the  transition was also  viewed as the return to a 
“civilized , European society ” with all  its democratic and personal freedoms; this I will 
label  definition POP2. No doubt many people would hold to both definitions  
simultaneously, though perhaps give more or less weight to each. For academics we see 
different views by discipline. Political scientists and historians  are most likely to focus 
on the dimensions of democratization and personal freedoms in the polity—call this 
definition POL.  Economists naturally will be most interested in the transition to a market 
economy with private ownership –here I suggest it is best to distinguish two  non-




The first, MRULE, includes  two key changes: changing the rules from central planning 
to competitive market decision-making; and changing  rules on ownership from a 
monopoly of state ownership to a predominance of private ownership. In popular 
parlance this is often described as moving to capitalism, but I argue that this term can be  
very misleading and the source of considerable differences in the interpretation of 
outcomes today. Capitalism  formally  refers only to the “ownership”  aspect, and one 
                                                 
4 Svejnar (1999) presages these distinctions , which he describes as “two conditions” that must hold  for 
transition to be completed. This paper takes a more formal  approach as elaborated later, though it is 
consistent with  Svejnar’s definition.   5
could have  monopoly capitalism, competitive capitalism or state-guided capitalism–
Galbraith among others  has argued  the first may be sometimes better. In today’s 
transition,  a form of capitalism can be said to have been achieved in  Russia or Ukraine, 
suggesting transition is over ,
5 but in fact the very non-competitive “oligarch “ capitalism 
of such countries is an incomplete transition relative to the open and competitive market 
rules benchmark. An alternative  interpretation for such countries is that transition is 
frozen part-way to a competitive and open market economy. 
 
MEFF refers to the “final” state of equilibrium reached after economic agents react to the 
new MRULE  and complete  the necessary  reallocation of resources  which achieves 
factor  efficiency in production  and optimal goods choice relative to demands /desires of 
population . Any economist will immediately imagine  an isoquant efficiency point and 
an optimal point on the production possibility frontier, and indeed this is the mnemonic I 
will present below to reflect the MEFF definition. 
 
In the present paper I argue that from the economist’s  perspective, the MEFF definition 
is the best  one for the ultimate question “is transition over,”  and that MRULE  is just the 
first step in  transition. Logically, MRULE is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
while MEFF is a sufficient condition because once it is achieved it must have been the 
case that MRULE was also  achieved. This does not mean that observing the progress to 
and completion of the MRULE condition is uninteresting. This is what the EBRD’s 
Transition Index ( and some new alternatives as proposed by Babetskii and Campos 
                                                 
5One  example is Aslund (1997) who  in my view misleadingly titles his otherwise excellent  book “How 
Russia Became A Market Economy”    6
(2007)   are all about, and likely this is what then  Prime Minister  Klaus had in mind in 
his 1995 statement. 
6 While the paper focuses largely on MEFF , I  also present a broad-
brush picture on  how close are different countries to MRULE completion.  
The other definitions, P1,P2, POL, are beyond the scope of this  paper, though elsewhere 




THEORETICAL BASIS OF ECONOMIC DEFINITIONS 
Two main schools of thought developed on how to do transition: the rapid  or Big-Bang 
reforms, vs. gradual reforms. Following Balcerowicz (1993) I eschew the emotive term 
“Shock Therapy”-it is telling that critics of rapid reforms often use this term, and 
proponents prefer “rapid or big-bang reforms.” In the early years of the transition many 
said that knowing exactly how to proceed was difficult because  “when the Berlin Wall 
fell there was   no theory of transition” (Roland, (2001 p. 29.) The  concern that one 
needed more time to think it  through and do it right, naturally led to a preference for 
gradual reforms. But in  retrospect the rationale for gradualism did not need this element, 
for the theoretical benefits of slower adjustment to dislocation of old industries to allow 
time for new market-responsive ones - as in Aghion and Blanchard (1994)- were based 
on  the same theoretical principles of efficient resource reallocation as  used  by rapid-
reform  proponents. More important neither of these explicitly  specified a structural 
                                                 
6   Inasmuch as by 1995 the EBRD Transition  Index for the liberalization components of reform –
excluding their second-phase institutional indicators – had reached  a value of  4.0 by 1995 and 4.22 in 
1996 compared to a top value of 4.3., the statement was only slightly premature IF transition were defined 
as MRULE. But subsequent events in the Czech Republic and elsewhere demonstrated that even MRULE  
cannot be restricted to the narrower market liberalization actions alone but must include the deeper 
institutional rules as well. 
7 Havrylyshyn (2006). In the political science literature one of the important articles on the same theme of 
democracy-market correlation, is McFaul (2002)   7
model of transition. Unfortunately, “there is no theory” was also used as a rationale by  
opponents to reform  such as the old Soviet elite of academic economists and many 
politicians, bureaucrats.
8 Arguing that there is a theory of markets, and a theory of 
socialism, but no theory of transition is  very ahistorical as it implies that going from 
markets to socialism was a known path, while the reverse is unknown. In fact  there was 
no theoretical work  before 1917 by Mark, or Engels, or Lenin, or Luxembourg or anyone 
else  about how to create socialism, it was done very pragmatically and ad hoc.  The 
correct historical analogue   is  perhaps the very pragmatic views of   rapid-reform 
leaders, such as Laar ( 2002) the first PM of Estonia who described the strategy as 
“Goodbye Lenin-and just do it!” 
 
Given how far transition has gone, to  worry about whether there is or was a theory of 
transition  may be irrelevant even for academics-but for my purposes it is necessary to go 
back and seek retrospectively the implicit  “theory of transition” in order to have a logical  
basis for defining its end-point. This is not such a difficult task. While no one in the 
economics literature has proposed formally a theory of transition,  a simple combination 
of Kornai’s (1994) definition (change of rules and incentives in particular elimination of 
central plan, price liberalization, allowing private ownership, and  imposition of hard-
budget by state), combined with  Blanchard’s ( 1997 ) definition (resource reallocation 
and efficiency improvements in reaction to new incentives) , provides a sufficient  
“theory” of what transition is. Let me call this the KB theory of transition. Note that 
Kornai’s changes  coincide with the MRULE definition, and Blanchard’s with the MEFF 
one. I contend without elaborating here that earlier and coterminous writings on 
                                                 
8 A good example is Bogomolov (1987).   8
transition, whether espousing big-bang, gradualism ,or institutional evolution, all 




As economists communicate best using equations or diagrams, let me suggest  the most 
effective representation of this  KB theory of transition is in a simple Production 
Possibility Frontier  (PPF)  as in Figure 1.  The figure shows the conventional production 
possibilities trade-off assuming full and efficient employment of all resources , between 
two types of goods –say good A is machinery and good B is consumer goods. Relative 
world prices  are shown as WP; society’s indifference curves reflecting preferences 
among the goods are not shown to avoid visual clutter. A second PPF is shown  farther 
out  to reflect higher capacity of production with additional resource growth or 
technological improvement over time. 
 
The MRULE changes of Kornai are, with the exception of world prices (WP)  implicit in 
the derivation of the PPF; they are to be envisioned in the production isoquants of 
different products/firms, and the imposition of the new market determined prices for 
goods and factors of production. It is of course the combined movement of each 
production unit to the efficient isoquant points that lies behind the movement of the 
economy from inside the PPF to the PPF . 
 
 
                                                 
9 I do elaborate in Havrylyshyn (2006 ) Ch.1, and Roland (2001) makes a similar argument about 
underlying aims and concepts of all three schools of thought. He also shows without elaborating the same 
PPF representation that is central to my exposition.   9
 
FIGURE  1  
HOW THE PPF DEFINES 
TRANSITION AND ITS END
 
 
While CP* Can be considered the Central Planner’s Optimum combination of A ( 
machinery ) and B (consumer goods), it may not be achievable in practice unless one 
accepts Oskar Lange’s theorizing with bonuses replacing profits -which Hayek inter alia  
disputed saying even  these  incentives were simply not enough. There is a wide 
consensus that by the 1970’s  or earlier the actual position was inside the PPF at CPI 
(Inefficient). As  Kornai (1994) showed the first step in transition, imposing a  hard 
budget, leads to a transition recession with  output declining to CPU (underemployment ). 
Whether one starts here or at CPI does not materially affect my argument-in either case it 
is clear the system in under-producing relative to potential, and is generally oriented   10
towards a high ratio of Machinery to Consumer goods in upper left part of the 
possibilities area. Once the Kornai rules are put in place , structural adjustments will 
begin to take place both to reduce socialist inefficiencies and underutilization of capacity- 
i.e. recovering from the transition recession-and  the system  moves towards  CPI and 
CP*, and then with resource reallocation along the PPF. I do not address here the 
legitimate question whether  all the rule changes have to be in place before  resource 
reallocation begins. While no one has argued such an  extreme view, it is possible that 
some partial combination may result in faster adjustment than some other partial 
combination.
10 These second-best  issues are beyond the paper’s scope. 
 
The end-point  of the transition process is  M1, the efficient market equilibrium 
compatible with world prices (WP). This point must also be an optimum for the societal 
preference point of view, hence one can envision an Indifference Curve equilibrium at 
point M1 as well. The steps taken in the transition  are roughly simultaneous, though non-
simultaneity is  unimportant to the main argument. These steps are : 1-output decline due 
to hard-budget from CPI to CPU; 2- recovery of output with socialist capacity back to 
CPI; 3- resource allocation efficiency improvements to bring economy  to socialist 
optimum CP*; and 4- movement along PPF reallocating resources among goods to reflect 
preferences and comparative advantage in an open economy. Thus, the end of transition 
under definition MEFF is reached at the market equilibrium M1. Section III presents 
some stylized facts which proxy the attainment  of  point M1. 
                                                 
10 This is a key part of the sequencing debate; one example of an analysis along these lines is Zinnes, Eilat 
and Sachs (2001) which show econometrically that efficiency improvements of privatized firms were 
greatest where liberalization was accompanied by well-implemented institutions ensuring open and 
competitive markets.   11
 
Figure 1 can also depict the POP1 definition of transition’s end: a movement  to a higher 
level of production for all goods ,  ( the higher PPF and an analogous equilibrium M2) 
hence a higher per capita income. This is not explored further here, but it goes without 
saying that except for the very early period where transition is merely correcting socialist 
shortcomings, all of the adjustments 1,2,3,4  may still be occurring when the move to 
higher income, 5, begins. In this paper the focus is on measuring  end-point M1. 
 
III.  DERIVING  MEASURES OF THE  MEFF END-POINT 
While quantitative economic analysis covers a wide range of underlying theoretical 
concepts and provides numerous statistical estimation methodologies of lesser and greaer 
sophistication, it is not usual to find direct  estimates of the PPF. The closest to this are 
efficiency frontier estimations of the underlying isoquants, typically done for a category 
of good or sector of production.
11 An efficiency frontier study for a single product is itself 
a massive econometric exercise using huge micro-data sets; to determine if an economy 
is at M1 for all goods produced is an impossible  undertaking. I propose a shortcut 
identifying  some proxies for this adjustment process, motivated by the well-known 
consensus on the allocation faults of the socialist economies. The bench-mark for end-of-
transition is set as  the value of each of these indicators  for “similar” market economies- 
that is economies at about the same level of development.  
 
                                                 
11 So far the number of such studies for transition countries is extremely limited; one example for Czech 
Republic is Sabirionova , Svejnar and Terrell (2005.) They find Czech-owned firms are far  inside an 
efficiency-frontier for all Czech firms including foreign owned.But they do not compare to a global 
frontier..   12
 While many previous studies have directly or indirectly asked the question how far has 
transition gone, in most cases  the implicit definition was MRULE, and the most widely 
used measures were the Transition Indicator of the EBRD or an earlier analogue 
developed in the World Bank. One  exception was Gros and Steinherr (2004) who took 
the same approach of comparing broad allocation indicators to similar market economies, 
but they used 1997 data. The present  paper  not only provides a clear theoretical basis for 
the definition, but also gives   more recent information where available, and covers a 
wider range of indicators, especially on  external trade. The paper of Lazarev and Paul 
(2007) uses a similar cross-section econometric estimates to assess if Russia has achieved  
“normal” levels for consumption share and industry share.  Their findings are mixed , but 
generally suggest that for some indicators the answer is “yes” , for others it is “not yet;” 
they do not cover any other countries. In this paper I will  present data for a wider range 
of countries showing values in  four main indicators as  summarized in Figure 2. 
 
The most important socialist  faults were : 1) an anti-consumer bias seen for example in 
the very low level of automobile and telephone ownership; 2) over-industrialization and 
its mirror image a very low share of services activity in GDP; 3) a closed economy with 
low ratio of trade to GDP and as a consequence an inward orientation of trade among the 
countries of the socialist bloc; 4) goods-specific allocations that were not necessarily 
reflective of comparative advantage either within the bloc or outside. The first three do 
not need further comment as there  has been a very strong consensus about them outside 
and inside the socialist bloc. This is somewhat less clear for the comparative advantage 
issue; even before 1990, while most outside experts held this view, some were less sure   13
suggesting that  for example the concentration of Eastern European satellites on  small 
and medium manufactures while the USSR concentrated on natural resources and heavy 
industry was not altogether wrong. Even if one agrees the socialist period allocations 
were not comparative-advantage based, as the next section shows it is not so easy to 
determine today what is each country’s comparative advantage, hence not easy  to judge  
how close the adjustment has come to new equilibrium. 
Yet another widely observed distortion was the existence of shortages and the consequent 
queues for these  goods. Thus, another proxy for the end of transition could be  the 
disappearance of queues.
12   I do not use this proxy for two reasons. There is no statistice 
to measure this as is the case for the above four proxies. But in addition, the 
disappearance of queues was only a first step in the reallocation of resources,-i.e.  the 
clearing of a particular  retail , consumer, market  -but not yet the reallocation of 
resources in production that marks the real transformation. In practice queues did 
disappear very early as prices were freed, but until other adjustments this meant many 
low-income consumers had to cut back to even lower levels of consumption. Only with 
later reallocation, more production, more imports, could all consumers enjoy a welfare 
gain . 
 
With these qualifications, consider what each of these four main faults implies about the 
nature of correction during the transition, and  what then is the benchmark value to be 
used in determining if transition is over. Correcting the anti-consumption bias means 
most broadly that the share of Personal consumption in GDP should go up, and the most 
sensible benchmark is middle-income or upper-middle-income market economies. These 
                                                 
12 I am grateful to Frank Lewis for  pointing this out.   14
data are easy enough to compile from sources such as the UN National Accounts Annual  
or the World Bank  World Development Indicators.  Illustrative of some of the most 
obvious shortcomings for consumers were automobiles and telephones-for each of these 
it is again relatively straightforward to compile UN statistics for the comparison. Others 
like housing space and quality, clothing variety, video and audio equipment could be 
measured as well. But the  results below for autos and telephones are sufficiently 
representative  of the changes since 1990. 
 
Correcting the over industrialization  means the share of GDP Value-Added of the 
manufacturing or industrial sectors should fall over time. The benchmark for M1 here can  
 
FIGURE   2 
STYLIZED FACTS IMPLIED BY PPF 
FRAMEWORK
• CORRECTED FAULTS
• CONS share GDP up, e.g. 
more autos, tel. per 1k pop
• Manuf. share down, Serv. 
Up
• Share of trade with 
SOCBLOC falls, with 
ROW rises sharply
• Export patterns shift to 
new  comparative 
advantage
• END-BENCHMARK
• Similar market economy 
ratio CON/GDP, autos etc.
• “Chenery Equations” for 
predicted share of manuf.
• Gravity model prediction 
of trade by partner
• Differs by country, and 
very difficult to estimate 
empirically—will use 
qualitative indicators
   15
 
be more rigorous than a simple comparison with similar market economies : it is well 
known in development theory going back to Clark (1940) that this share at first increases 
as an economy develops with the counterpart share of agriculture declining. After a 
certain income level somewhere in the middle of the range the manufacturing share 
begins to decline, with  agriculture continuing to decline but services increasing. 
Econometric cross-country analysis of what these shares have been historically was done 
as early as the 1960’s by Chenery and followed up intensively at the World Bank  
culminating in the massive study of Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin  (1986). Using this 
approach some recent studies for transition countries by Doehrn and Heilemann (2005) 
and Thiessen (2004) provide estimates of this benchmark that I will use in next section. 
 
The closed and inward-oriented economy of the socialist period should in transition 
become more open so that its Trade/GDP ratio rises, and  each country’s trade should 
become more geographically  diversified with the share of exports to the socialist bloc 
falling and the share to the rest of the world rising. All these data are straightforward and 
need little comment. In the case of geographic diversification  the benchmark comparison 
is more sophisticated than a simple average of similar countries: numerous gravity model 
studies have been done for transition countries  before, during and after the transition –
these are relied upon for the comparison to follow and appropriately referenced there. 
 
Finally, there is the  fault of not allocating at the right position on the PPF given world 
prices. This is far more difficult to measure short of the extensive  underlying  factor    16
availability studies done by  Leamer ( 1985) and others. Furthermore, the fault may have 
been different for each country in the bloc. There do not appear to be estimates using this 
approach  for transition countries to my knowledge, hence discussion on this “fault’ will 
be much more qualitative.  
 
Given the methodological difficulty of establishing a benchmark for comparative 
advantage prudence might suggest leaving it out altogether. I include it warily, and only 
because it has become a very big policy issue in some countries, especially the larger 
ones in the former USSR. In Russia , Ukraine and even Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan it is 
strongly argued by many that transition has destroyed or hollowed out the Soviet 
industrial strengths and “forced” many countries into  the  “backward” status of natural-
resource providers or at best producers of low-tech goods. This is reminiscent of earlier 
arguments of the Dependency School of Thought which faulted resource  reliance for the 
underdevelopment of Third World countries.
13 While I will argue below these concerns 
are misplaced, or at best the reasons for lack of technical progress up the ladder of 
comparative advantage are misunderstood,  ignoring this issue  because data is uncertain 
is not justified. 
 
IV. IS TRANSITION OVER? SOME STYLIZED FACTSTHE 
MRULE: CEB VIRTUALLY COMPLETE, OTHERS LAG BEHIND 
                                                 
13 There were of course earlier precedents As a Canadian  I studied the thesis of Canadians being “hewers 
of wood and drawers of water “ for the advanced industrial economies. In the Socialist World the theories 
of Rosa Luxembourg  on imperialists exploiting the natural resource producing colonies are well known.   17
Before considering the stylized facts on correction of socialist faults ,it is useful to ask 
how close are countries to completing the first step of Kornai, changing to MRULE . The 
EBRD provides a  widely used  annual transition progress index (TPI ) consisting of  
market liberalization measures (LIB) , market institutions implementation (INST) , and 
infrastructure reform. I leave out the last, and use the average of the others as an estimate 
of achievement of  MRULE .  
 
First some definitions  and explanations are in order. TPI is the average of eight  EBRD   
subcomponents measuring progress towards a market on a scale from 1.0 to 4.3 , the top 
value representing  a fully functioning market economy similar to current ones outside 
the post-communist region. Three sub-components-liberalization of prices, of trade , and 
small scale privatization can be defined  narrowly as LIB, the other 5 are institutional rule 
changes such as entry and competition  conditions, and these I label INST. The 
shortcomings of the TPI have been noted by many , though apart from the recent efforts 
of  Babetskii and Campos  (2007) no alternatives have been presented and analysts of 
transition use this index widely. Two “tests” of the index give some comfort. First, the 
above study does find values for some countries that are not as high, and finds many 
more reversals –e.g. Russia- than does the EBRD; but on balance the general trends  over 
time and differences across countries are very similar. My definition of INST  I consider 
far from ideal for the concept and much less comprehensive and detailed than the 
institutional indicators of the World Bank Governance Indicators and the related Doing 
Business indices. Its advantage is the long time series EBRD provides;  Havrylyshyn   18
(2008) shows that for recent years INST and other similar measure have correlation  
coefficients of 0.90 or higher. 
 
Table 1 presents data for 27 countries in 5 groups  showing the following :  the year in 
which  (LIB)  reached  4.0, the year in which the TPI including LIB and INST  reached 
4.0, and the value of  INST in 2007. 
 
 
TABLE 1.   IS TRANSITION OVER USING MRULE? 
COUNTRY YEAR  LIB=4 YEAR  TPI=4 INST  /2007 
Croatia  1994  [[ 3.7]]   3.16 
Czech.    1992 2007   3.50 
Hungary  1994 2005     3.75 
Poland  1993 2007   3.50 
Slovakia  1992 2007   3.42 
Slovenia 1996    [[3.5]]  2.92 
CENTRALEUR      3.38 
Estonia  1994 2006 3.75 
Latvia 1994  [[3.8]]   3.25 
Lithuania 1994  [[3.8]]    3.32 
BALTICS    3.44   19
Albania 2000  [[3.2]]    2.17 
BosniaHerceg.  [[3.8]] [[2.7]]   2.08 
Bulgaria 2000  [[3.9]]    2.92 
Macedonia 1994  [[3.4]]    2.50 
Montenegro  [[3.5]] [[2.8]]   2.00 
Romania 1998  [[3.4]]    2.75 
Serbia 2007  [[3.0]]   2.25 
SE-EUROPE      2.38 
Armenia 2001  [[3.3]]    2.33 
Azerbaijan 2007  [[2.7]]    2.00 
Georgia 1997  [[3.5]]  2.17 
Kazakhstan 1997  [[3.2]]  2.42 
Kyrgystan 1995  [[3.2]]  2.08 
Moldova 2005  [[3.1]]  2.33 
Russia 2007  [[3.1]]  2.58 
Tajikistan [[.3.8]]  [[2.6]]    1.67 
Ukraine 2007  [[3.2]]    2.50 
CISM        2.23 
Belarus  [[2.4]] [[1.9]]   1.80   20
Turkmenistan  [[1.9]] [[1.3]]   1.00 
Uzbekistan  [[2.7]] [[2.2]]   1.75 
CISL      1.51 
 
 
The country groups  have a broadly  regional character, but in fact  were defined on basis 
of a homogeneous degree of progress in transition shown by the TPI in about the years 
2004-5–Havrylyshyn (2006).  A purely geographic definition might  have included 
Croatia and Slovenia in South-East Europe  (SEE) but their objective reform conditions 
are more similar to Central Europe; Similarly, the last group, CISL  ( countries of CIS 
with very limited reform progress) include Belarus in the extreme west of the CIS, and 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in Central Asia, while other Central Asian countries are 
found similar to more western CIS cases. 
14 The other nine CIS countries are clearly 
much farther ahead with at least moderate reform progress and I label them CISM. 
 
The first two columns  shown in Table 1  for each country are meant to  capture 
respectively the near-completion of MRULE for the narrow liberalization actions, and the 
near-completion of MRULE for the  full complement of transition reforms; given the 
imprecision of EBRD’s top value of 4.3, I suggest it suffices that a country pass 4.0 to 
consider the task  largely completed -especially since in practice there have been no cases 
of substantial backsliding from these high values.  For countries that had not reached  4.0 
                                                 
14 I am not denying geography has played a role in determining  advancement in transition and explore this 
in the 2006 study. For present purposes interpreting  the grouping by the  degree of transition is more 
meaningful.   21
by 2007, Table 1 shows instead  the  actual value reached in 2007 in [[square brackets]]. 
The third  column gives the actual value in 2007 for INST. 
 
Taking the TPI at face value, what does Table 1 tell us about the first  end-point of 
transition defined as MRULE? For Central Europe and the Baltics (CEB) the LIB actions 
were  largely completed very early between 1992 and 1994, with one exception, Slovenia 
in 1996. It  is particularly  noteworthy  that the Baltic countries starting  only about 1992 
had  completed these by 1994,  no later than most of Central Europe. Only Poland and 
Czechoslovakia were earlier. For INST and hence the overall TPI , reaching  a 4.0 value   
took much longer, indeed  it is still a little short in four cases: Croatia, Slovenia, Latvia 
and Lithuania. 
 
But even the  four CEB laggards were far quicker than all other transition countries.  On 
LIB alone  most SEE  and CISM countries  have by now reached the 4.0 threshold-
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Tajikistan excepted. But apart from Bulgaria none 
has come even close to completing the rules change in the INST category, thus overall 
their  EBRD score implies even the first step in completing  transition is far from done. 
The three CISL countries remain closer to a socialist set of rules than the market . 
The broad picture of CEB near completion, SEE and CISM moving forward but still 
short, and CISL virtually unchanged from socialist period will be repeatd in analysis of 
the indicators for  MEFF completion below. 
   22
 Before turning to that it is worth making a small digression on  the sequencing of LIB 
and INST. In  the early debates on how to do transition the gradualist school and even 
more so the  institutional evolution school emphasized the advantage of first putting in 
place good market institutions before completing all liberalization and privatization steps. 
The reasoning was in theory sensible, that good institutions were needed to ensure 
liberalization resulted in the  smoothest reallocation and largest possible efficiency 
improvements.  (see Roland (2001)).But the actual path followed by transition countries 
has made it historically impossible to test this hypothesis, because not one single case of 
a country moving faster on institutions than on liberalization is to be found. To the 
contrary all had faster progress on LIB than INST, and if a pattern exists it is that those 
who moved fastest on LIB followed up quickly on INST and closed the gap within about 
a decade, while those who delayed LIB, moved even more slowly on INST  increasing 
the gap between LIB and INST.
15  
 
The remainder of Section III presents data for the proxies of MEFF defined earlier, each 
addressing a major structural distortion of the socialist system. In general, values shown 
will be averages for the country groups defined in Table 1 rather than those for each 
transition country .For the most part the CISL laggards will not be analysed in detail, as 
their structural adjustments tend to be much less complete than even for the CISM 
countries-not surprising given how far behind they are in achieving the MRULE . 
 
 ANTI-CONSUMER BIAS: LARGELY CORRECTED FOR ALL 
                                                 
15 This point is not central to the present paper, and is elaborated in Havrylyshyn (2008).   23
The first socialist  distortion noted was an anti-consumer bias. To assess  how much this  
has been corrected it suffices to observe the simple share of Personal Consumption in 
GDP. I use World Bank World Development Indicators  data here to construct Figure 3., 
showing this share for three years in CEB, CISM , SEE, and as a benchmark of “similar” 
market countries Upper Middle Income  Countries (MIDNC).  
 
For  CEB and CISM one sees a very similar picture : a sharp increase within the first five 
years already  from  below 50% to  a little under or over 60%. This brings them close to 
the  “similar” countries benchmark with values at 60%. Some overshoot is seen in 1995 
for SEE countries, perhaps reflecting the much greater macro instability there and the 
longer period before recovery of government revenues and investments. The SEE values 
seem much higher from the start and may  be due to the lower income levels as well as 
much greater political instability. In any event , the broad-brush conclusion seems clear: 
the anti-consumer bias has been quickly and probably completely corrected in the entire 
transition region, that is the position on the PPF of Figure 1 has shifted as expected from 
the upper left to the lower right with relatively more consumer goods . 
FIGURE 3:    24
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As a specific illustration of this  correction  one can observe what has happened to the per 
capita ownership of two goods especially under-consumed in socialist economies,  
telephones and automobiles.  Figures 4 and 5 (constructed using UN  Annual Statistical 
Yearbook data) suggest a dramatic fulfillment of consumer’s pent-up demand for these 
items, particularly in the CEB countries where economic recovery came soonest. 
16 For 
telephones a caveat is in  order: the numbers include both land and cell which reflects not 
just a transition change but a global leap-frogging of one of lower-income countries to the 




                                                 
16 Some of the country  groups in Figure 5 for autos  are different because of data availability in the source;  
Baltics not shown, Russia-Ukraine shown separately and OCIS (other CIS) does not include all countries.   25
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In the case of automobiles  some special circumstances may prevail as well, for example 
the short distance from West Europe to SEE  making transport of used autos far easier.; 
anecdotally it would appear this was not a huge deterrent in Central Asia because there 
was  a displacement effect: Europeans and  Japanese vehicles would first go to the closer 
FIGURE 5   26
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countries (SEE , Russia, Ukraine), but then old Soviet autos from there would go to 
Central Asia . As one might expect the increase in auto ownership in Russia and Ukraine 
( averaged) is much lower than in Central Europe even by 2005 after their growth surge ; 
at the same time it is distinctly higher than in the other CIS countries. 
 
OVERINDUSTRIALIZATION: ESSENTIALLY CORRECTED IN CEB, 
ONLY PARTIALLY  IN CIS  
The second structural  distortion analysed concerns the  over industrialization of socialist 
economies, that is a  value-added share of Industry in  GDP  higher than comparable 
economies. This problem also commonly involved an over emphasis on heavy and   27
probably military industry  compared to light , consumer goods., but here I deal only with 
the overall industry share; some of the excess of heavy is in any event captured in the 
anti-consumer bias given the essentially closed economies. A broad comparison of the 
changes since 1990 is shown in Figure 6, which gives the share in three years 
(1990,1995,2005) for the original EU-15 as a  rough benchmark, the New Member States 
acceding in 2004 (NMS)- which equates to the CEB group save for Croatia- Belarus 
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17 The data were compiled at the Vienna Institute for International Economics within the INDEUNIS 
project, whose results are presented in Grinberg, Havlik and Havrylyshyn (2008).   28
The over industrialization is evident in the 1990 panel; compared to a share of just over 
30% in the EU15, nearly all the centrally planned economies had values  of  about 50%. 
The exception of Kazakhstan at about 35% is explainable by its relative  strength in 
natural resources even in the Soviet period.  This incidentally hints at the possibility that 
within the Socialist bloc some reflection of comparative advantage was incorporated into 
the planner’s choices.; I come back to this in  discussing comparative advantage 
adjustments.  
 
Within a short five years these shares fell sharply for the transition economies to levels 
somewhat over 30%, but the 1995 values may not have been a new equilibrium yet, 
partly because of the short time for adjustment and in the case of the CIS countries 
because of the deep and continuing transition recession which, following Kornai (1994 ) 
was likely to have affected industry in particular.  The 2004 values , while confirming the 
long term downward trend  for the NMS, suggest less adjustment for the CIS. The  NMS 
or CEB countries saw a slight further decline to about 32 % on average  only somewhat 
higher than the share for the EU15. For the CIS countries in the sample the share stayed 
in the range 35-40% and over, with some experiencing a slight rebound and Kazakhstan 
rising to a  share even higher than in 1990.  
 
Thus it is clear that the trend was a correction of over industrialization in  all these 
transition countries. But that does not provide a direct answer to the question “is 
transition over?” ,  have they reached the MEFF point? For that one needs a more 
appropriate benchmark than the EU 15 which of course have a much higher level of   29
development. I turn next to the issue of what should be the “norm” for the transition 
countries. 
 
As already  noted, the basic principle originating with Clark (1940)  is that the optimal 
share of industry in GDP varies with the level of development  (y in eq.1) increasing  
from low income levels to intermediate ones as the economy moves from an agrarian to 
industrial phase, but then declining as income continues to rise and the economy moves 
to a services phase. But as Chenery, and others discovered in  econometric studies across 
a large sample of countries  income alone does not fully determine the optimal shares; the 
size of POPulation , geographic SIZE  of country and availability of natural resources  
NATRES affect the result as well; country specific dummies are also often included in 
such an equation. Thus, a typical Chenery equation would be: 
 
(1) INDSH= a + by, +cy2 + d POP +eSIZE+f NATRES+ DUM 
 
An early analysis for transition countries  Gros and Steinherr (2004) was done for  1997 , 
which at  less than a decade is perhapos too short ,  especially for CIS countries where 
transition might did not  start until about 1993-5. As Figure 6 suggested these late starters 
experienced considerable volatility in output and this share. Nevertheless it is noteable 
that Gros and Steinherr  using this share indicator as well as some others similar to those 
in the present paper,conclude that for “Central Europe the transition is nearly over” , 
while the others remain far behind. I will show below that their early conclusion remains   30
valid with more recent data. Lazarev and Gregory (2007) for Russia alone  are less firm 
in their conclusions , but show the same general direction of change.  
 
More up to date Chenery-type equations have been estimated for Central Europe ( but not 
CIS) in Doern and Heilemann (2005) and Thiessen (2004) and I  use their results to 
summarize the status of this adjustment .But even  these too  may be by now outdated and 
have only partial coverage- there is a clear research agenda established here. Since the 
results for CEB do suggest an adjustment period of  at least  10 perhaps even 15 years 
after the initial MRULE is achieved, one might speculate that the CIS  equilibrium may 
not be reached until 2010 or later  given  LIB  values approached 4.0 only after  2000. 
But the question  of which countries have and which have not completed transition can be 
tentatively  addressed already.  Figure 7 summarizes the results from the above two 
studies . 
 
Figure 7 gives approximate  values of the industry share before transition  (1988-90), 
Chenery equation predictions from the two studies , and the actual shares in 2005 as in 
Figure 6. For the NMS.  Chenery predictions are shown as a range , while for Russia, 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan  which were not included in the cited studies, I show my own 
“best guess” on the following assumptions: Ukraine with limited natural resources and  
development level  slightly lower than Central Europe, is likely to be at the top of the 
NMS range, about 35%; Russia with a comparable level of development is likely to be  
lower given its strong natural resource endowment, as is  Kazakhstan. 
   31
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  If these educated guesses for the three CIS countries are reasonable then it follows that 
they are far from completing this part of the transition, with actual share values 
considerably in excess of   the norm for countries at that level of development ,and in 
case of Russia and Kazakhstan far more industry than their natural resources would 
suggest. For Central Europe and the Baltics , the levels reached by 2005 are very close to 
or lower than predicted, implying that for them the over industrialization is fully 
corrected—on this score their transition is over.    
   32
TRADE ORIENTATION: ALL VERY  OPEN ;  DIRECTION  OF TRADE 
NORMAL  FOR CEB, CLOSE FOR CIS 
In the socialist period the ratio of trade to GDP was not that low  at 10-60% ,because 
there was a  lot of trade in the Comecon region. Nevertheless with the transition virtually 
all transition economies very rapidly opened to trade beyond the old bloc and the ratios 
attained  100% and more by 2005. (Broadman  (2005, p.297, Fig.11.1.) Turkmenistan is 
an exception, but interestingly the other two CISL laggards have very high openness 
ratios.  Of course, as with the industry share this alone is not the full story: the benchmark 
share for “similar” countries can  be  estimated  using Chenery-type equations . Ellborgh-
Woytek  (2003)  as well as Capolupo and Celli (2005) do this in a partial way and come 
to the conclusion that indeed  comparable levels have been reached in most countries. 
The evidence while incomplete is so strong that one can be comfortable concluding that 
the trade-opening adjustment is essentially complete. 
 
 Perhaps a more important dimension of the structural change was the substantial shift in 
direction of trade from the earlier inward-orientation. I focus on that dimension in this 
paper, recognizing that for the former USSR republics the introduction of borders may by 
itself reduce trade among them by  some amount .
18 But the degree of inward orientation 
was so extreme that the  large change seen was almost certainly not due to the formality 
of borders. Furthermore , to ensure this border effect is excluded, I measure for an 
individual country, say Ukraine, the share of its exports to the EU 15 (Western Europe ) 
before and after independence,  showing  in Figure 8 the trend from 1990 to 2005 .  
                                                 
18  That borders do matter even when formal trade restrictions are virtually zero is shown for   Canada-US 
trade flows after the North American Free Trade Agreement by  McCallum (1995).   33
While this does not cover all global exports it is the predominant share for exports 
outside the old bloc, and thus serves as a good  proxy for the geographic reorientation of 
exports in the transition process. The dramatic shift since 1990 is evident in all countries 
and groups. It was most immediate for Central Europe, jumping from 20-40% in 1990 to 
over 60% by 1995, then stabilizing at about 65%. For the Baltics it was even more 
dramatic , from less than 5% to well over 50%.  With the exception of Russia , all USSR 
republics had very limited exports to EU-though some of this was accounting, attributing 
to State-Trading firms in Moscow exports from other republics. It is thus not surprising 
that the biggest jumps were in Baltics and less so Ukraine which went rather more slowly 
from 5% in 1990 to about 25% in 2005. Russia started much higher at 20%, and this 
doubled to 40+%; here however some of the increase was not volume but price effect, as 
the dominant export was energy. The same sharp reorientation is seen in SEE. 
 
   F I G U R E       8      34
 
 
But can one say the geographic orientation is complete?  One way to answer this is to use 
gravity models to estimate what the “normal” share of each destination should be for a 
country’s exports and compare to  the actual . The general form of such an equation is: 
(2)  Xij= a + bYi+cYj+dDISTij+eDUM 
Where Xij is export from country i to country j; Y is GDP of each country, and DISTij is 
the distance (in kilometers or travel costs ) , and DUM are variables reflecting special 
relations between i and j such as common language, contiguous borders, free trade 
arrangements and the like.  The coefficients b and c are positive and d is negative.  
 On this aspect of adjustment a lot of prior gravity model studies for transition countries 
have been done allowing a quick summary comparison as in Figure 9.
19 For CEB, Russia 
                                                 
19 The various studies used are described and referenced in Grinberg ,Havlik, Havrylyshyn (2008) , Ch. 2. 
Three examples  are in References here :Havrylyshyn and Pritchett( 1991), Vavilov and Viugin (1993), and 
EBRD Transition Report  2003.   35
and Ukraine this shows the initial share of exports going to the EU in the pre-transition 
period about 1987, 
 
FIGURE   9 
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Baltics 4 60-70 55-65
Russia  20 35-40 40-45
Ukraine  5 30-35 20-25
 
 
 the range of predicted values for this share in various gravity model studies, and the 
actual share  range in the period 2000-2005. Given the different methodologies and 
coverage by the studies, and given some instability in these shares over the transition 
period as  the new equilibrium was being sought, I prefer to give ranges of values rather 
than averages, though the basic conclusion are not much affected by either choice. 
Clearly, the CEB countries appear to have completed their geographic orientation 
towards Europe ; Russia exceeds the estimated norm but perhaps only because  energy 
prices had been very high; Ukraine has not yet reached the share that would be “normal.”    36
There is no hard evidence for other CIS countries or SEE, but it is likely that like Ukraine 
the shift has been substantial but still incomplete. Once again as with previous indicators , 
the conclusion seems to be that in Central Europe and the Baltics the transition is 
essentially over, but in other countries it is still incomplete.
20 
 
HAS THE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE EQUILIBRIUM BEEN 
REACHED? MAYBE,  MAYBE NOT. 
As noted at the outset, determining if transition countries have achieved the new 
comparative advantage equilibrium is far more difficult than for the other indicators.  A 
country’s comparative advantage is not simply the allocation between manufactures and 
natural resources—though this is part of the story—and since the issue involves a large 
number of goods  Chenery-type equations for  cross-country comparison are not enough; 
much more complicated models measuring endowment of several factors (capital, labour, 
human capital, land, minerals, energy  etc )  and relating them to tens if not hundreds of 
products would be needed. The  massive work of Leamer (1985) doing this   has not been 
repeated often. Therefore in this part of the paper the approach will be less rigorous and 
more qualitative. While the question “is the new equilibrium reached” cannot be 
answered,  it is possible to determine if the  change in composition of trade has been large 
or small. 
 
                                                 
20 The causes for a faster or slower shift in trade patterns are discussed for example in Hoekman and 
Djankov ((1997) and Havrylyshyn and Al –Atrash (1999).   37
Let me start with the broad allocation of commodity exports into agricultural, natural 
resource , and manufactured goods. Figure  10 shows that for Central Europe (=NMS5) 
the manufactures share has risen steadily, albeit from an already high level over 70%. 
 









90 95 00 05 90 95 00 05 90 95 00 05 90 95 00 05
Agriculture Natural Resources Manufactured Goods
Source: wiiw
NMS-5 SEE-4 Russia Ukraine
 
 
In contrast SEE , Russia and even Ukraine show a  slight decline  in favour of an increase  
in the natural resources share. In fact for Ukraine this natural resource content of exports 
is probably even higher inasmuch as major  exports like chemicals and metallurgical 
products  require large resource and energy  content. Kazakhstan is not shown but it 
exhibits the same trend, reflecting the large new petroleum exports, similar to Russia.  
   38
The continued emphasis on resources  has caused great  concern in the large CIS 
countries and Russia in particular, that the pre-existing industrial base, skills, and 
technology have been eroded by the transition and the economies are  moving not up but  
down the  ladder of comparative advantage from more sophisticated goods like 
machinery, aviation etc.
21 But it is very difficult to determine if this movement is away 
from or towards a new equilibrium, especially given the earlier consensus that socialist 
economies overemphasized industry and in particular heavy-industry. It is surely not 
surprising that countries with rich natural resources and energy as Russia and  
Kazakhstan, or Uzbekistan with cotton, and Moldova with mild climate for fruit orchards, 
might see at least initially a structural shift towards more and not less natural resource 
exports. Having said this, it is also the case one might have expected  the strong scientific 
and educational endowment of the USSR to bring about an increasing export of more 
high-tech products . 
 
An increasing sophistication of exported products is clearly observable in the CEB 
countries. Numerous studies have looked at the changed composition in terms of capital-
intensity, skill-intensity, low vs. medium vs. high technology content, and have generally 
found this changed in an upward direction very quickly already in the nineties.
22 An 
illustration of this  and the very different outcome in CIS countries is given by a proxy 
for technical sophistication of exports: the widely used measure of Intra-Industry Trade , 
                                                 
21 This is explored in detail in Grinberg , Havlik, Havrylyshyn (2008); see Havrylyshyn chapter and on IIT 
chapters by Ferlo  and Soos.  For measures of skill-intensity and quality of exports in Central Europe see 
Dulleck, Foster, Tehrer, Woerz (2005), and Kandogan (2005 and 2006).  
22  I will not give details here , as the references and a summary of the many findings are available in the 
preceding citation in great detail.   39
or IIT.   A summary of approximate values for IIT in transition countries and some 
comparator market economies is shown  in Figure  11. 
 
FIGURE    11 
INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE 
INDEX    COMPARISONS
Industrial
















In Central Europe IIT was in a range similar to that seen in industrial countries 25 years 
earlier, and generally higher than values for emerging market economies in the  nineties. 
In contrast Russia and Ukraine are well below those of Central Europe; other CIS have 
even lower values. Thus, there was a much more dynamic structural change in Central 
Europe, and perhaps an approach to their new comparative advantage equilibrium.  Why 
did this not happen in the advanced CIS countries ? 
   40
 There are three  possible explanations: first it has not happened yet because the MRULE 
reforms came much later and are still incomplete; second they  may in fact be at their 
new equilibrium at least for now because many of these countries do have much larger 
natural resource and agricultural endowments; a third explanation is particularly 
emphasized in Russia today, that  too-rapid reforms killed off the old industrial potential 
and to revive it one now needs special “Industrial Policy” measures to promote new 
comparative advantage industries. 
23This debate is beyond the present paper which only  
asks whether the new equilibrium positions have been reached. For comparative 
advantage, I do not think it is possible to give a clear answer other than to say Central 
Europe has clearly seen much more dynamism and change in the type of manufactured 
goods it exports.    
IV.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this section  I  recap  the main findings, briefly discuss what if any surprises are found 
relative to expectations at the outset of transition, and  list the  issues that merit further 
research.There are many different ways of defining the end of transition, and here my 
answer to the question “is transition over”  will be  based only on the economic definition 
presented in Sec.II and the actual   measures  of how much socialist distortions have been 
corrected  shown in Sec. III. Using these measures  four   summary points stand out. . 
 
First,it seems  clear that countries in Central Europe and the Baltics have essentially 
completed the transition or very nearly so in all dimensions, while for countries  of the 
                                                 
23 The case for Industrial Policy is given in Filatov. Grinberg,Porfirov and Silvestrov  chapter and Mironov 
and Dorogov chapter in the Grinberg, Havlik and Havrylyshyn (2008), the counter arguments are  in 
chapters of Havrylyshyn, Havlik, and  Hunya.   41
CIS , or other former Soviet republics transition is  only partially over. In South-East 
Europe  the picture is more mixed, with countries that took longer to achieve political 
stability such as Serbia and Bosnia much farther behind, others like Bulgaria and  
Romania are catching up to Central Europe. The main explanation for why some 
countries have completed transition or nearly so is their earlier and more resolute 
progress on changing the economic rules of the game. 
 
Second,  however, the correction of the anti-consumer bias seems complete everywhere  
with attainment of a consumption to GDP ratio  in the same range  as similar market 
economies ( about 60%).. This probably reflects two things: the transition recession 
sharply cut  revenues of government  hence its size , and all consumers, in reformiong 
and non-reforming economies  tried to fulfill the pent-up demands as soon as their means 
allowed. 
 
Third, for the indicator concerning attainment of comparative advantage, that is   
achieving the optimum point on the PPF, it is not possible to conclude with the same 
confidence as for the other measures. Nevertheless it is again clear that Central Europe 
and Baltics  have been moving much more dynamically to a change in structure of their 
manufactured exports than others. The   increase in the share of natural resource exports 
for many of the CIS countries
24  is sometimes taken as evidence that  they have regressed 
in comparative advantage and lost the manufacturing  strengths of the Soviet period.  
Given the difficulty of measuring the “correct” comparative advantage for any country, it 
is not possible to confirm or refute this interpretation. But I have argued that for many of 
                                                 
24 This is also true for many of the SEE group, though the paper does not present this evidence.   42
these countries the known underlying endowments of natural resources would be 
expected to lead exactly to such a result as a mirror image of the correction in over-
industrialization . At the same time, it is conceivable that some of the more advanced CIS 
economies should have had the ability to convert their strong military-industrial 
complexes  based on an unquestioned high level of scientific knowledge, into  
comparative advantage for new hi-tech products. So far Central Europe has been able to 
achieve more of this than the CIS-probably again due to the lead on MRULE.   
 
Fourth, and qualifying the first conclusion, even in the advanced transition countries of 
Central Europe and Baltics, there remains a significant transition policy task: completing 
the various institutional reforms relating to regulations in the financial sector, competition 
policy, minority shareholder rights , legal institutions , etc. The EBRD scores for the 
“institutions” rules are clearly still lagging behind liberalization. Arguably, the  standard 
of the EBRD indicators is too high for the question “is transition over”- their top score of 
4.3 is generally defined as “standards and performance of advanced industrial 
economies” while in this paper  I contend the proper comparator is similar middle and 
upper-middle income market economies.
25 The EBRD does not of course provide 
estimates for such economies, but the Governances Indicators  of the World Bank do, and 
without a detailed analysis  thereof, it appears  the  institutional qualities of  MRULE in 
Central Europe is roughly similar to comparable economies.  This is clearly an interesting 
area for further research ., with the most important analytical question being not simply 
                                                 
25 Havrylyshyn (2008b) uses the World bank Governance Indicators such as rule-of-law, regulatory quality, 
corruption control, to show that CEB countries have attained levels comparable to, or even superior to 
those in East Asia and other upper-middle-income countries.   43
what levels are reached, but if the institutional part of MRULE is not complete, how does 
one explain that the actual structural changes to achieve MEFF have been completed?    
 
There are a number of  surprises in these results.  It is generally perceived that countries 
of South-East Europe and the CIS are lagging behind considerably in  the reform process, 
but surprisingly this is not so for the changes in liberalization policy  such as free prices, 
private sector activity, open economies. On these indicators, all but a few laggards
26 had 
nearly completed the reforms  in the period 2000-2005. It is on the institutional or 
second-phase reforms that they lag considerably behind  Central Europe. 
 
Related to this is a surprise on the actual sequencing followed by countries for  
liberalization and institutional change.  Much criticism has been made of the big-bang or 
rapid reform strategy for overemphasizing liberalization and not paying enough attention 
to institutions. The early arguments of intuitionalists that it is better to put in place some 
good institutions first then liberalize may appear to be vindicated by the data of  Table 1.  
Indeed these advanced liberalizers do  lag on institutions. But the surprise is that 
countries which delayed liberalization did not  move faster on institutions.  To the 
contrary, the slow liberalizers were even slower on institutions. It is remarkable that in 
practice, not a single case exists of a country that tried to follow the prescription of the 
institutionalist school of thought-even those like Belarus and Uzbekistan that professed to 
be going slowly on liberalization to put in place the right conditions in fact lagged very 
far behind on institutions. 
 
                                                 
26 Exceptions are  Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan   44
I suggest there is an important political economy interpretation here. Countries and 
leaders  that were deeply committed to reforms  were sincere in their views that first they 
need to do the stabilization and liberalization, and then they would follow with 
institutions. With a lag they did. Country leaders  that professed to be delaying  
liberalization for the sake of setting up good market rules, were not strongly committed to 
reforms, but were arguing for the delays so as to position themselves and the “new 
capitalist ‘ supporters in establishing a strong ownership and market-dominance position. 
I contend that the  much greater role of “oligarchs”  in CIS than in Central Europe is due 
to these delays. The proof of this pudding is in the statistics of Table 1: where 
liberalization was delayed, institutional reforms were delayed even more. 
 
I turn finally to a few thoughts on further research. First, the area of what is or is not 
comparative advantage merits much more investigation, especially to address the burning 
issues in advanced CIS countries like Russia and Ukraine whether they are or are not 
allocating efficiently, whether or not “Industrial Policy” could help speed the process of 
moving up the ladder of comparative advantage  to goods of higher skill and technology 
content. 
 
Second, the issue of institutional change and whether it has achieved in transition 
countries levels comparable to  “similar’ mid-income economies deserves more 
investigation. But the interesting aspect of this is not simply the comparison, but an 
analysis of what levels of attainment on institutions are the minimum necessary for 
stimulating the structural changes in transition and promoting a path of strong economic   45
growth. This is of course a broader question of development globally, but the very 
unusual and rapid changes in the transition economies provide a unique laboratory for 
this research experiment. 
 
Third is the possibility of more direct econometric efforts using efficiency frontier 
methodologies to address the question “is transition over?” The value of such difficult 
and large exercises may be less in confirming or correcting the results of using proxy 
indicators for the endpoint as I have done here, but in the revelations of differences in the 
catch-up process by country, by sector or type of good, by ownership structure-small, 
large, domestic, foreign, state , private.  
 
A final word: for many observers and policy makers the question addressed here may be 
of little relevance, as it is in other ways felt in the bones that transition is over in Czech 
Republic or Hungary or Estonia.  And I certainly agree with the view that having to deal 
with conventional fiscal, or balance of payments, or banking problems is a sign of having 
reached market economy status. But this exercise and the suggested further research does 
have value not only  for a historical understanding of an extremely important historical 
phenomenon, but also for the insights it reveals about structural changes in the economy 
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